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Lonergan’s Theory of Historiography  





This article focuses on the importance that Lonergan attributes to his-
torical knowledge (historiography). After having traced the cultural 
and ecclesial climate that led him to take an interest in the question, 
this text presents the ambitious project by Lonergan denominated 
“transcendental method” and of the “functional specializations” in 
which he articulates this method. Then it analyses the functional spe-
cialty “History” and the various related themes: the presuppositions 
of his theory of historiography, historical objectivity and perspectiv-
ism, and the role of values in historical knowledge. In the conclusion, 
a critical balance is formulated starting from the aspects raised. 
Keywords: Historicity, historiography, metaphysics, perspectivism, 
systematics, Vatican II 
 
 
The name of the Canadian philosopher and theologian Bernard J.F. 
Lonergan (1904-1984) is often associated to his main work Insight. A 
Study of Human Understanding, (1953)1. Through this work, his in-
tention was to transpose the fundamental Thomistic acquisitions in 
the cultural background of his time, characterized by scientific revolu-
tion and post-Kantian philosophy. He afforded the study of the insight 
inasmuch as he intended both to find an invariant basis from which 
all the different sciences depend and to favour knowledge integration. 
 
1 Lonergan 1992. 
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On 1953 Lonergan came back to the old continent to teach sys-
tematic theology at the Gregorian University in Rome up to 1965: it 
was the same university where he had prepared his doctorate about 
gratia operans in Thomas Aquinas a decade before (1940) 2 . This 
change of place came out to be very favourable for his research, as 
he encountered the continental philosophies, especially historicism, 
existentialism and hermeneutics. 
He addressed his studies towards human historicity and histori-
ography. His interest for human historicity led him to recognize the 
social and cultural influences on human consciousness, as well as to 
acknowledge a cultural pluralism, in spite of the vision of a normative 
and universal culture in which, according to him, the Catholic theolo-
gy had closed itself in the last centuries3. He deepened his reflection 
on consciousness from a historical/cultural point of view in particular 
through the notion of “meaning”, going beyond the mainly transcen-
dental analysis begun in Insight. His interest for historiography arose 
from his knowledge of the XIX century German Historical School, af-
ter he read some XX century works on historicism and hermeneutical 
philosophy4. 
 
2 Lonergan, 2000. 
3 Following the reflections of the German philologist Bruno Snell, Lonergan named 
this cultural vision “classicism”. With this term he indicated the vision according to 
which circumstances were something accidental, but a substance, a nucleus, a sta-
ble, fixed, immutable root rested beyond them. He stated also: “To confine the 
Catholic Church to a classicist mentality is to keep the Catholic Church out of the 
modern world and to prolong the already too long prolonged crisis within the 
Church”; see “Doctrinal Pluralism” at 75 (in Lonergan, 1996b: 70–104). 
4 First, Lonergan read three classics of the historiographical method of the late XIX 
century: the Historik (1857-1882) of Johann G. Droysen, the Lehrbuch der histor-
ischen Methode (1889) of Ernst Bernheim, and the Introduction aux études his-
toriques (1898) of Charles-Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos. For historicism, 
his interest was for Wilhelm Dilthey, and more marginally for Friedrich Meinecke 
and Max Weber. For the interpretation of the historicism, he read mostly Karl Heus-
si, Erich Rothacker, Peter Hünermann, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. He gave great 
attention to the French historian Henri-Irénée Marrou. For the English and American 
historiography, one has to mention mostly Carl L. Becker, and Robin G. Colling-
wood, in the second place Arnold J. Toynbee, Eric Voegelin, and Christopher Daw-
son, to a lesser extent George P. Gooch, Bruce Mazlish, Patrick Gardiner, and Fritz 
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From this study, Lonergan reached the conviction that it was 
time for theology to abandon the Neo-Scholastic Denkform to face 
the historical critical research and its interpretation of the Christian 
sources. In fact, the painful event of modernism seemed to be over 
after Pio XII’s last remarks against the nouvelle théologie, while the 
historical studies had invaded the theological knowledge thanks to 
the forward direction of the Vatican II Ecumenical Council. 
Anyway, Lonergan was a “systematic” theologian. So, he had 
understood the impossibility to proceed with the old speculative the-
ology style, but at the same time he did not want the theological 
knowledge could get lost in the labyrinth of the historical and philo-
logical studies. His aim was to link and reconcile history and theology. 
However, the relationship between history (exegesis, history of dog-
ma, etc.) and systematics (speculative theology) required a base 
within a wider frame. He found such base at the end of his route from 
Insight to the publication of Method in Theology twenty years later 
(1972)5, a route undertaken with the aim of establishing what he 
called a “transcendental method”, suitable to lay the foundations of 
the single methods used in the different fields of knowledge. Lon-
ergan organized this method in some functional specialties. Among 
them he described “History”, to which he gave the goal to establish 
(through the rational judgment) the real development of the past 
events. As regards this goal, one has to verify whether the fact, that 
Lonergan found “History” on the metaphysical knowledge expressed 
in Insight and in particular on the rational judgment, really allows to 
ascribe his historiographical theory within the historiography of histo-
 
Stern. Lonergan also studied the contributions of the philologist Snell and the phi-
losophers Ernst Cassirer and Gadamer. On Lonergan’s approach on these authors 
(see Guglielmi, 2015: 61–154). 
5 Lonergan, 2017b. 
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rians, or rather within a critical and epistemological philosophy of his-
tory6. 
 
1. Transcendental method and functional specialties 
The methodological question recurred up to Method in Theology, but 
there through the more sophisticated project of the so-called “func-
tional specialties”, on which his transcendental method has been ar-
ticulated. He defines this method in these terms:  
 
It is a method, for it is a normative pattern of recurrent and 
related operations yielding cumulative and progressive re-
sults. It is a transcendental method, for the results envis-
aged are not confined categorially to some particular field or 
subject, but regard any result that could be intended by the 
completely open transcendental notions7. 
 
The starting point was the same of Insight: the analysis of all the 
stages of the knowledge process. However, the increase of level 
number of the formally dynamic structure of intentional conscious-
ness was a novelty. 
According to the Canadian philosopher, the individual person is 
characterized by a stream of spontaneous self-arranged operations, 
which constitute the intentional consciousness as a dynamic, norma-
 
6 Here I will not focus on the question of the relationship between history and sys-
tematics in Lonergan’s thought according to the line of the speculative approach of 
R.M. Doran (1990; 2012; 2005). Rather, I will adhere to a historiographical re-
search perspective. Thus, my study has a greater affinity with the works of Th.J. 
McPartland (2001; 2010). 
7  See Lonergan 2017b: 17-8. Our author uses this adjective carefully to avoid 
misunderstandings. He it therefore distinguishes the transcendental in the 
scholastic sense that opposes the categorical, and the transcendental in a Kantian 
sense that reveals the conditions of possibility of knowledge of an object. Of course 
he connects here to the "transcendental" in the Kantian sense. 
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tive and invariant structure. In detail, Lonergan identified four levels 
of consciousness. 
The first one, so called “experiential”, is made up by all the op-
erations the person follows in his sensory extroversion: feeling, pay-
ing attention, and imagining. Lonergan underlines that in this first 
stage the person is present to himself as experiencing, and expresses 
his intentionality by paying attention and selecting data. 
The data of sense, in turn, are a substratum for higher activities, 
which spontaneously arise in the person urged by his need to investi-
gate data, find an intelligible connection and finally reach understand-
ing. Lonergan calls this second level “intellectual”, because it is the 
result of questions for intelligence, such as “what is it?”, “why?”, 
“how?”. Following these questions, the empirical data are investigat-
ed, examined, and definitions, postulates, conjectures, hypotheses, 
and theories about them are formulated. So the intelligent individual 
goes beyond the experiential individual, because through insight 
grasps an intelligible connection in the data and among them. Then, 
what is reached in the insight is expressed in concepts. These are the 
final product of the intelligent individual’s activity (supposing, think-
ing, considering, grasping, formulating, defining) and in particular of 
his insight, which is a key operation of the whole knowledge process. 
However, according to Lonergan, the individual is not satisfied to 
formulate hypotheses, conjectures or concepts. In fact, human inves-
tigation does not stop at the questions for intelligence, but goes on 
with the question for reflection: “is it true?”. This question expresses 
the further intentional energy of the individual who wishes to over-
come imagination, idea, theory, concepts and systems, and asks him-
self whether what was carefully experimented and cleverly under-
stood is really true or not. So the third level of consciousness reveals 
the rational individual who, avoiding the conflict among the under-
stood results, wants to be subjected only by the truth criterion, that 
Giuseppe Guglielmi, Lonergan’s Theory of Historiography 
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is to establish what is, or is not, real. In Longman’s opinion, a com-
plete knowledge is reached only by the rational judgment. Pretentious 
ideas, brilliant theories, thorough thinking systems are not enough; 
we need to judge the truthfulness and rationality of these thoughts. 
Through the judgment, Lonergan insists, the individual grasps some-
thing, and such grasping is not a mere logical process, a mechanical 
abstraction, but a new insight, by which the individual becomes con-
scious that there are no other relevant questions from which further 
insights may arise to complete or modify the previous insight8. 
However, aside from experience, questions for intelligence and 
concepts, questions for reflection and judgments, also questions for 
deliberation do emerge in the human mind: this is the fourth level of 
consciousness, the level of the existential individual who has to man-
age decisions, freedom, self-control, and the direction he wants to 
give to his life. According to Lonergan, this fourth level gives man the 
chance to reach a more complete self-transcendence compared to the 
results of the previous levels. In fact, by passing from a level to the 
next one the individual gets only a partial self-transcendence, while it 
is only at this fourth level, the moral one, that he gets a real existen-
tial self-transcendence. By asking himself “what have I to do?”, “is it 
worthwhile?” and performing the specific operations (conscious delib-
eration, reliable valuation, free decision, and action) outcoming from 
these questions, the individual, Lonergan concludes, oversteps 
knowledge opening himself to the universe of values and to the re-
sponsible action. 
In this way, Lonergan explains the intentionality of conscious-
ness as related to a variation of levels. The individual experiences and 
realizes more and more his own subjectivity when he moves from the 
simple sense operation (empirical consciousness) to intellectual oper-
 
8 Cf. Lonergan, 1992: 309. 
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ation (intelligent consciousness), to judgment on intellectual results 
(rational consciousness), and to practice of his own freedom (moral 
consciousness)9. 
Then, starting from his investigation of the human cognitive and 
deliberative activity, the Canadian philosopher traced two sets of 
“functional specialties”, each set with four specialties, with aims and 
results similar to those of the four levels of consciousness (at this 
point, we are interested to the first set). In fact, as the result reached 
at the experience level consists in the discovery and collection of da-
ta, so the specialty “Research” (for example, textual criticism) pur-
sues the goal to search for pertaining data and make them available 
to the students for their researches. And, as at the second level of 
consciousness, that of the intelligence, one grasps the connection 
among the discovered data, so “Interpretation” has to understand the 
meaning that the author intended for a text made now available by 
“Research”. Again, as the reason confirms, through judgment, the ex-
istence or not existence of truth, so the “History” specialty has to es-
tablish what had really happened in the past. Finally, as at the fourth 
level, that of decision, the individual struggles with a practical choice 
and with what this choice implies (values conflict), so “Dialectic”, 
meant as evaluative history, has to recognize and highlight conflicts 
about values, facts, meanings and experiences in view of their further 
resolution10. 
 
9 With other words, Lonergan wrote: “On all four levels, we are aware of ourselves 
but, as we mount from level to level, it is a fuller self of which we are aware and 
the awareness itself is different” (Lonergan, 2017b: 13). 
10  The primary interest of Lonergan is directed to the application of functional 
specialties, derived from the transcendental method, to theology. In continuity with 
the theological tradition of the auditus fidei and of the intellectus fidei, Lonergan 
distributes this project in two distinct phases of the theological exercise. A first 
phase “mediates” the past of the Christian tradition; a second phase, called 
“mediated”, deals with formulating and applying the Christian message to the 
present cultural context. In other words, the first phase assumes the task of using 
all the resources of historical-critical and hermeneutical research to meet the 
constitutive past of a particular religious tradition. The second phase undertakes to 
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Lonergan defined these specialties as “functional” because they 
refer to the operations of consciousness, which every student per-
forms. However, even if each student of whichever field works at all 
the four levels of consciousness (experimenting, understanding, judg-
ing, and deciding), the difference of the specialties is based on the 
fact that each of them works to reach its own goal. For example, 
Lonergan pointed out that in “Research” a textual critic works not on-
ly at the experience level, as if he ignores the other consciousness 
levels, but has to choose the right method (decision level) to reach 
the discovery (intelligence level) of what he may reasonably affirm 
(judgment level) that it has been written in the original text (experi-
ence level). In other words, the textual critic works on all the four 
levels, tough his aim is the end of the first level, that is establishing 
the data11. Lonergan extended this argument to the other specialties, 
as they are interdependent and alternating in a cumulative process: 
“Interpretation” depends on “Research”, and vice versa; “History” de-
pends on both “Research” and “Interpretation”, and provides them a 
context and prospects within which they can work; “Dialectic” de-
pends on “History”, “Interpretation”, and “Research” and, at the 





elaborate a theological discourse capable of integrating itself fully into the present 
of the believing community, and more generally of the culture. Because of this 
double articulation, according to Lonergan, in theology there are not four, but eight 
functional specialties. The first phase is ascending (from the connection to 
experience to the connection to responsible choice); it is common to theology and 
other human sciences: theology in oratione obliqua; it consists of the specialties 
“Research”, “Interpretation”, “History” and “Dialectic”. The second phase is 
descending (in an inverted order, from the connection to responsible choice to the 
connection to experience); it is peculiar of theology: theology in oratione recta; it 
consists of the specialties “Foundations”, “Doctrines”, “Systematics”, and 
“Communications”. Cf. Lonergan, 2017b: 120–130. 
11 Cf. Ib.: 128. 
12 Cf. Ib. 134–135. 
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2. Critical history 
In his Method in Theology Lonergan got back the Insight transcultural 
basis to provide a methodological groundwork to the varied world of 
culture that, in his opinion, until then did not have a methodological 
unification. Thus, this second work, even if it attests (in kulturges-
chichtlich terms) a number increase of research fields (meaning, 
hermeneutics, and historiography), must be read in formal continuity 
with Insight. On the other hand, this continuity is guaranteed by the 
same epistemological and metaphysical system on which the histori-
ography theory of Method in Theology is based. As an example, we 
may refer to the closeness of History to rational consciousness. A his-
toriography based on a reflective understanding, like Lonergan’s one, 
must have the goal of establishing (judgment) what happened. But 
even before going through this central aspect, we find the connection 
with the knowledge doctrine presented in Insight in the distinction 
between experience, intelligence, and historical judgment that opens 
the § 2 “Historical experience and historical knowledge” of chapter 
“History” in Method in Theology. As Lonergan thought that knowledge 
was made up of experience, intelligence, and judgment, so he be-
lieved that the historical knowledge was the result of historical expe-
rience, historical intelligence, and historical judgment. Historical ex-
perience represents the first form of history, that is living or existen-
tial history, and extends also to a first and rudimentary objectifica-
tion, defined as “pre-critical history” by Lonergan himself. Historical 
intelligence and historical judgment work the passage from existential 
history to putting it to theme, and so represent the “critical history”. 
As for the first form of history, the existential history (res ges-
tae) or living tradition, which forms a community, it was defined by 
Lonergan as “history that it is written about”. This existential history 
is well expressed by the psychological time, that is the stream of acts 
Giuseppe Guglielmi, Lonergan’s Theory of Historiography 
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made by a conscious individual, which extends to the past through 
memories and to the future through expectations13. 
Lonergan defined the objectification of existential history, the 
historia rerum gestarum, simply as “history that is written”. It is this 
kind of history that underlines the passage from the historical experi-
ence to history meant as a methodologically based knowledge of the 
past. However, the passage into scientific history does not occur im-
mediately, but gradually. The first objectifications of existential histo-
ry, such as autobiographies (in the form of diaries or memories) or 
biographies, are still simple and rudimental stories. Lonergan includ-
ed in pre-critical history also the narration of particular events 14 . 
These have the aim to promote the knowledge and the identity of a 
group. Lonergan did not define this kind of stories with other names, 
but they can be led back to the category of Croce’s “pseudo-
history”15. In fact, in Lonergan’s opinion pre-critical history is charac-
terized by its intent to narrate (chronicle), persuade the reader, and 
defend its own community from external detractors (poetic and ora-
torical stories) and so on. 
Unlike pre-critical history, critical history does not turn anymore 
towards simple details or proof collection, nor does pursue apologetic 
goals. According to Lonergan, the aim of critical history is to grasp 
changes, processes, and developments (co-operations, institutions, 
relations, values) which have caused a situation of standstill or, oth-
erwise, the decline or ruin of a group or nation16. Although this goal is 
very different from the simple narration of chronicles, Lonergan add-
ed that a historian cannot fulfill his job by resorting to an abstract 
logic, either theological (theology of history) or dialectic (philosophy 
of history), but he always has to refer to real human individuals and 
 
13 Cf. “Time and Meaning” at 106-08 (in Lonergan, 1996a: 94–121). 
14 Cf. Lonergan, 2017b: 171–173. 
15 Cf. Croce, 1921: 11–45. 
16 Cf. Lonergan, 2017b: 173–183. 
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to their specific actions. At the same time, critical history gives a 
more complete vision of the past than the previous forms of history, 
even if it refers to the roughness of life. Hence, this assertion opens 
up the analysis of the theoretical nucleus of Lonergan’s historiograph-
ical reflection and of his metaphysical foundation. 
 
3. Metaphysical structure and historiographical theory 
In his Insight Lonergan worded metaphysics as the integral heuristic 
structure of the being proportionate to human knowledge. In this 
structure, Lonergan included and identified the act of knowing and 
the known content; he affirmed that, while the “content” of a cogni-
tive action is still unknown until a specific knowledge is reached, the 
same cannot be said about the general characteristics of the “act” 
used for this knowledge. As a matter of fact, these characteristics are 
known, and can provide a premise for the content that has to be 
known. Therefore, Lonergan linked the metaphysical elements of po-
tency, form and act to the operations that cause knowledge (that is, 
experience, insight, and rational judgment). Through this heuristic 
and transcendental setting of metaphysics, Lonergan wanted to over-
come the dogmatic and fixed concept of metaphysics on which phi-
losophers like Cassirer had already worked, and to open it to a con-
frontation with science and common sense. The metaphysical 
knowledge was no more conceived as an exclusive knowledge that 
keeps out all other knowledge, but as taking over the results of the 
other knowledge integrating them in a coherent view17. 
According to this premise, Lonergan affirmed that metaphysics 
also gives the methodological and epistemological conditions of “His-
tory”. In fact, he confirmed his metaphysical vision also about histori-
cal knowledge. Beyond sensism, idealism, and naive realism, he be-
 
17 Cf Lonergan, 1992: 418–419. 
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lieved, on one side, that the object is different from the subject and, 
on the other side, that the object has the characteristics of the same 
cognitive process of the subject. If, in general, the being represents 
all that can be attentively “experimented”, cleverly “understood”, and 
rationally “judged”, in the same way historiography, as a particular 
knowledge within the wider metaphysical horizon, has to retrace the 
same epistemological and ontological structure. So, according to Lon-
ergan, we can get a real historical knowledge only through the judg-
ment operation, because only through a factual judgment (“it is it re-
ally so!”) the subject can catch and recognize an object of thinking as 
something belonging to the absolute realm of being. Then, historical 
judgment is just a specific case of application of reflective under-
standing. By the judgment, the historical inquiry finally grasps the 
actual evidence and the historian can determine what had happened 
in the past18. Only within this speculative background it is possible to 
understand why Lonergan insisted in thinking that “History”, even if 
connected with the specialties “Research” (experience) and “Interpre-
tation” (understanding), has a higher aim as its goal: to present what 
has happened, stressing on the rational judgment formulated after 
having grasped a virtually unconditioned. And indeed, in Lonergan’s 
system, this complete knowledge can be reached only at the third 
level, by the rational judgment19.  
Hence, in Lonergan’s opinion, the historical judgment is an oper-
ation overcoming “Interpretation”, because – and this is a crucial 
point of his theory – the task of the prior specialty “Interpretation” is 
to settle, through the study of witnesses, what an author or a per-
sonality of the past meant (meaning), while it is only “History” that 
properly knows, because only the historian, by weighing the testimo-
 
18 Cf. Lonergan 2017b: 217. 
19 Cf. Ib.: 128. 
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nial evidences,20 formulates the judgment on how the events of the 
past had actually taken place. This historical judgment goes very over 
the meaning found in “Interpretation”, because critical history discov-
ers something that, up to then, has been merely “experimented” and 
“understood”, but not properly “known”21. By giving to the functional 
specialty “History” a specific goal and result, Lonergan did not intend 
to affirm that “History” only accomplishes the operations of the corre-
sponding consciousness level. Within every specialty, all the opera-
tions of the four levels of consciousness are in act22, but the opera-
tions of the other three levels have to be considered as functional to 
the purposes of the specialty of the main level taken into account. 
That is why the historian operates also at the second level, that of 
intelligence (understanding), but the historical intelligence is here at 
the service of the superior and specific goal: judging (rational 
knowledge) how facts had really developed. Hence the same histori-
cal intelligence cannot be compared to the intelligence or understand-
ing proper of “Interpretation”. The goal of “Interpretation” is to un-
derstand what the authors meant, while the intelligence of “History”, 
overcoming the intentions of authors, wants to understand the object 
to which the sources referred. 
Lonergan recalled some meaningful points in order to clarify the 
peculiarity of historical intelligence. First, it is necessary to identify 
 
20 Lonergan conceived the same reorganization of the testimonies as a simple re-
edition of the historical experience, and not as a historical knowledge. He believed 
that only by this knowledge it is possible to grasp the evidence of the testimonies 
and then to establish what was really happening (see Lonergan, 2017b: 175). How-
ever, arguing that by the only search for evidence the contemporary (or the histori-
an) produces a mere “re-edition” of historical experience, Lonergan seems not to 
recognize the fact that the heuristic phase already represents a distance away and 
an interpretation of the historical experience. Any contemporary (or historian) al-
ways selects the material according to personal interests. 
21 Cf. Ib.: 182. 
22 For example, Lonergan recognized that the interpreter also operates at the four 
levels of consciousness, experimenting, understanding, judging, and evaluating; 
nevertheless, the purpose of the interpretation, according Lonergan, remains to 
understand the meaning of a text (see Ib.: 158). 
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authors and set them in their space and time, to study their environ-
ment, to verify which goals they had in their writing, who their read-
ers were, which their sources were and what use they did of them. 
This is a step to the first goal of the historical intelligence, that is to 
understand what the authors of the sources intended to do and how 
they did it. From this result, it was possible for Lonergan to face the 
proper object of the historical intelligence: “understanding the pro-
cess referred to in one’s sources” and so “determining [judgment] 
what was going forward in the community”23. This passage from the 
historical intelligence to the historical judgment occurs through a self-
correcting learning process: a combination of questions, intellections, 
conjectures and images gives origin to further questions, to a more 
accurate selection of the testimonial evidences and to further intellec-
tions resulting from the obtained historical discoveries. New connec-
tions and interconnected entireties come out gradually, the arrange-
ment process goes on more and more; intellections are no more vul-
nerable24 and the historical research comes to an end. If no further 
questions are presented, the historian can “affirm” that, on the basis 
of what turned out to him, the issue is closed. However, this assertion 
occurs only by the operation of the rational judgment. Only the histo-
rian is able to detach himself from the personalities and their inten-
tions, in order to establish (historical judgment) what has happened 
in a group or in a community. At this point, one of the cornerstones 
of Lonergan’s theory comes out clearly: the difference between the 
goal of interpretation and that of history, a difference that plunges its 
roots in Lonergan’s epistemological theory that does not exchange 
 
23 Ib.: 177. 
24 On vulnerable and invulnerable insights, cf. Lonergan, 1992: 309. 
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understanding (Verstand) with the faculty of judgment, but distin-
guishes understanding from judging25. 
From these Lonergan’s statements about historical knowledge 
based on the rational judgment, it is easy to recognize the peculiar 
influence of the Thomistic philosophy, in particular of the judgment 
grasping the absolute and unconditioned aspect of an object of think-
ing (concept). Furthermore, we may consider the wider plan of the 
functional specialties of Method in Theology, which also includes the 
four specialties “Foundations”, “Doctrines”, “Systematics”, and 
“Communications”, all devised by Lonergan as specific cases of theol-
ogy26. At this point, we think that these last four specialties condi-
tioned the elaboration of the specialties of the first phase, those hav-
ing the task to meet the past and a value not only for the theological 
matter. Actually, the theological concern to mediate the Christian 
message into the present cultural context, that is the systematic and 
pastoral perspective of theology, not only brought Lonergan to dupli-
cate the functional specialties when referring to the theological 
knowledge, but also prevailed over the previous specialties “Re-
search”, “Interpretation”, “History”, and “Dialectic”, assigning them 
concerns in some way opposed to their character and making the 
positive knowledge connected to these specialties subordinate or ori-
ented to the theological reflection. 
But this is just the point: if “History” (like the other three spe-
cialties of the first phase) was just a regional area of interest within 
the wider metaphysic horizon, Lonergan could not but set the histori-
cal knowledge within this specific architecture of knowledge. A mean-
 
25 “Understanding grasps in given or imagined presentations an intelligible form 
emergent in the presentations. Conception formulates the grasped idea along with 
what is essential to the idea in the presentations. Reflection asks whether such un-
derstanding and formulation are correct. Judgment answers that they are or are 
not.” (Lonergan, 1992: 300). 
26 See above, note 10. 
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ingful validation on this matter can be found in an image used in 
Method in Theology to define the task of “History”: 
 
In military terms history is concerned, not just with the op-
posing commanders’ plan of the battle, not just with the ex-
periences of the battle had by each soldier and officer, but 
with the actual course of the battle as the resultant of con-
flicting plans now successfully and now unsuccessfully exe-
cuted (Lonergan, 2017b: 168). 
 
We may transpose this statement in terms of the isomorphism 
elaborated in Insight between the acts of knowledge and the ontolog-
ical structure of every kind of reality proportioned to the knowledge 
process. Then, this statement means that, as through the judgment 
the subject overcomes the data collected from experience (potency) 
and the hypotheses of intelligence (form) in order to catch the reality 
just like it “is” (act), so through the historical judgment we go beyond 
“Research”, which collects the personal evidence of the soldiers and 
the officials about the battle, and beyond “Interpretation”, which col-
lects the meanings intended and planned by each single chief, in or-
der to catch the “actual” development of the battle. 
The image of the battle unequivocally sets Lonergan’s theoretical 
standing about historiography, and at the same time allows some 
basic observations and objections. First of all, it reconfirms a well cir-
cumscribed idea of “Interpretation”, divergent from an ontological 
idea of hermeneutics. Secondly, by insisting on the judgment that 
catches the actual development of the battle, Lonergan seems to 
wink just at the objectivistic idea of historiography, especially in its 
positivist version, from which he had tried to distance himself. Finally, 
having considered the metaphysical ground on which Lonergan based 
the functional specialty “History”, we have to acknowledge that Lon-
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ergan’s historiographical theory involves an excess of the transcen-
dental over history, and so it moves towards an epistemological phi-
losophy of history rather than on the way of the historiography prac-
ticed by historians. Therefore, historians’ historiography seems to 
move towards other directions compared to this epistemological phi-
losophy of history, which insists specifically on the rational judgment. 
In general the historians deal with disciplinary epistemology (method, 
approach to sources, historical knowability), even in its different ori-
entations. They are more interested in the interpretation criteria that 
is the traceability of a reenactment. For this reason, historiography 
generally puts in the focus the matter of criteria and procedures used 
in the reenactment, which, in turn, must necessarily be visible to the 
reader; it does not consider the historical interpretation subordinate 
to the historical knowledge. In addition, it is just from this metaphys-
ical background that we understand the different historiographical 
codifications so frequent in Lonergan’s works. For instance, think 
about the organization of history in “autobiography and biography” 
(objectification of living or experiential history), “pre-critical history”, 
“critical history”, and “evaluative history”. It is an organization in 
compliance with the four levels of consciousness on which Lonergan’s 
transcendental method is based. 
 
4. The question of values in history 
If, through the self-corrective and cumulative learning process, “His-
tory” reaches what Lonergan elsewhere calls the “universal view-
point” 27  compared to the fragmented data and various interpreta-
tions, therefore establishing the way past events actually occurred, 
could the wide Lonergan’s project be considered as concluded? Not 
properly. Recalling and explaining some statements of Meinecke and 
 
27 Cf. Lonergan, 1992: 587-591. 
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Becker,28 Lonergan carried on his thought wondering if history, in ad-
dition to determine what had happened in the past (judgments of 
fact), should also give judgments of value about the same events. 
Actually, with this question related to the values within historiograph-
ical research, Lonergan did not intend to merely take part in the dis-
cussion raised by historicism, but rather to close the wider project 
begun with the previous functional specialties. “Research”, “Interpre-
tation”, and “History” aimed at an encounter with the past, and did 
not set moral, social, or cultural goals, at least in a direct way. How-
ever, as, according to Lonergan, the difference between judgments of 
fact (rational level) and judgments of value (moral level) is already 
operative in the subject (while the decision justified by value is not an 
arbitrary operation, because it is based on the spontaneous and 
structured relationship between rational and existential conscious-
ness), the historian himself cannot stop his work at the only critical 
history (rational judgment), but he rather goes beyond the mere as-
certainment of facts, up to the evaluation of facts (value judgment). 
Therefore, the meeting with the past cannot be complete if, in addi-
tion to history that understands the events, this one will not be fol-
lowed by a history that could evaluate the results, distinguishing the 
good from the evil. “Research”, “Interpretation”, and “History” 
 
 
28 “Friedrich Meinecke has said that every historical works is concerned both with 
causal connections and with values but that most historians tend to be occupied 
principally either with causal connections or with values. Moreover, he claimed that 
history, as concerned with values, ‘… gives us the content, wisdom, and signposts 
of our lives’. Carl Becker went even further. He wrote: ‘The value of history is … not 
scientific but moral: by liberating the mind, by deepening the sympathies, by forti-
fying the will, it enables us to control, not society, but ourselves – a much more 
important thing; it prepares us to live more humanely in the present and to meet 
rather than to foretell the future’” (Lonergan, 2017b: 230–231). Lonergan refers 
here in particular to the essay of F. Meinecke, Kausalitäten und Werte in der Ges-
chichte (1928), that he read in the English translation of F. Stern (1956: 267–288). 
Regarding Carl L. Becker, Lonergan takes up here a statement quoted by Ch. W. 
Smith (1956: 117). For the writings of Becker, Lonergan refers to their collection 
edited by Ph.L. Snyder (1958). 
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approach but do not achieve an encounter with the past. They 
make the data available, they clarify what was meant, they nar-
rate what occurred. Encounter is more. It is meeting persons, 
appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, 
and allowing one’s living to be challenged at its very roots by 
their words and by their deeds (Lonergan, 2017b: 232). 
 
According to Lonergan, we can only realize this operation by a 
further integration represented by the evaluative history actualized 
by “Dialectic”, which examines the vagueness of the human process-
es, both of the past human beings and the historians themselves. 
Therefore, all the specialized fields of the historical studies have to be 
employed in a continuous and always unfinished endeavor of media-
tion of the universal history. “Research”, “Interpretation”, “History”, 
and “Dialectic” take part to the development of the historical life (his-
toricity) and, in particular, “critical history” and “evaluative history” 
operate a critical and evaluative objectification and mediation of the 
original vital and dramatic history. So, Lonergan could affirm the rel-
evance of the evaluative history within the scientific history just on 
the basis of an ontological concept of history, which deepens its roots 
in the metaphysical position according to which the being is at the 
same time intelligible, true, and good. Ontology of history and meta-
physical reflection let Lonergan put in succession judgment of fact 
(rational) and judgment of value about the events and the personali-
ties of the past. Therefore, the evaluation did not appear an intrusion 
operated by the historian, because it corresponds both to the onto-
logical structure of reality with its transcendental peculiarities (verum 
et bonum) and to the relationship between the human being’s good-
ness (reality) and the historian’s judgment of value. 
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5. Historical objectivity between perspectivism and universal 
viewpoint 
Difference between interpretation and history; peculiarity of the his-
torical intelligence; unconditioned character of judgment; need of an 
evaluative history: weren’t all these characteristics overabundant to 
be conferred to historiography? Going on in our reading of Method in 
Theology, especially chapter nine entitled History and the Historians, 
it doesn’t seem risky to assume that Lonergan himself asked this 
question. In these pages, in fact, we can feel a kind of awareness of 
how problematic and incomplete was the historical knowledge. This 
might be the reason that brought Lonergan to report in these pages 
all the issues which had been discussed in the Methodenstreit, started 
in Germany between XIX and XX century and of which he interpreted 
the event through the reading (but not only) of authors such as 
Rothacker and Heussi. In particular, Lonergan adopted from Heussi 
his debate about the positivists’ tendencies, the ascertainment of the 
limitedness and complexity of history, as well as of the historian’s 
conditionings (language, education, environment), which determined 
a rule of perspective (point of view) in the historical survey29. 
By examining such problems, Lonergan came to a more deter-
mined ontological conception of history, interpreted as a great pro-
cess within which the historian’s very personal development is inte-
grated. According to Lonergan, the general process of history and the 
individual historian’s development give origin to a series of different 
points of view, from which different selective processes are clarified. 
In turn, different histories take shape from the different selective 
processes; such different histories, even if they are not contradictory, 
do not provide a complete knowledge and explanation of the histori-
cal facts, but only incomplete and approximate portraits of a tremen-
 
29 Cf. Ib.: 203–204. 
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dously complex reality. 30  In this way Lonergan, on one side, em-
braced an ontological concept of history as an ongoing process, a 
kind of space from which the historian himself comes and to which 
relates himself, but, on the other side, he also did not define this pro-
cess idealistically, because he did not mention an intellect able to 
bend and direct the tangible historical flux to the fulfillment of a re-
condite sense. However, it is also true that the uncertain outcomes of 
perspectivism, more in detail the Sinngebung as subjective ascribing 
of meaning, put Lonergan in precarious balance in relation to his con-
cept of objective knowledge of the past. So he had to clarify: 
 
In saying that historian cannot escape his background […] I 
am not retracting in any way what previously I said about 
the “ecstatic” character of developing historical insight, 
about the historian’s ability to move out of the viewpoint of 
his place and time and come to understand and appreciate 
the mentality and the values of another place and time. 
Finally, I am not implying that historians with different 
background cannot come to understand one another and so 
move from diverging to converging views on the past 
(Lonergan, 2017b: 206)31. 
 
This position is very revealing of the concept of historicity to 
which Lonergan had come during his career; this concept did not 
involve the declaration of a radical finitude of the human being, of a 
 
30 Each historian, performing his researches starting from his own context, raises 
questions different from those of other historians, and describes the results of his 
investigation (historical narration) in a different way. Thus, according to Lonergan 
history remains an open cumulative process; by its gradual advancement, the con-
text within which events have to be understood widens. In turn, by the progressive 
enlargement of the context, the perspectives also change (see Ib.: 179-180). 
31 Ib.: 204-205. 
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distrust in the possibility to reach an objective knowledge.32 From the 
theoretical premises of the historicity of thought and action, Lonergan 
inferred 
 
1) that human concepts, theories, affirmations, courses of 
actions are expressions of human understanding, 2) that 
human understanding develops over time and, as it 
develops, human concepts, theories, affirmations, courses 
of action change, 3) that such change is cumulative, and 4) 
that cumulative changes in one place or time are not to be 
expected to coincide with those in another (Lonergan, 2017b: 
302)33. 
 
Nevertheless, this description of historicity did not base an idea 
of perspective subjectivity, to which the search of regulative criteria 
for the development of historical world and of knowledge (judgment) 
of the past is precluded. On the contrary, Lonergan’s perspectivism 
was not as much the statement about the historian’s inability to come 
out of his ideas, as the awareness that the objectivity of knowledge 
has to be reached through personal paths34. 
The discussion about perspectivism was also an indirect chance 
for Lonergan to self evaluate his proposal. In fact, if historiography is 
dealing with time defined individualities (institutions, places, per-
sons), Lonergan had to admit, as he actually did, a series of problem-
atic elements. First, it was necessary to consider the choice at the 
base of the historian’s work. This operation, originating from the 
spontaneous development of common sense and intelligence while 
being influenced by the historian’s personal background, could not be 
 
32 On the question, see Beards, 1994. 
33  See also “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness” at 170-75 (in Lonergan, 
2017a: 163-76). 
34 Cf. Lonergan, 1996b: 75-6. 
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explained in its starting conditions nor in its effective realization, but 
had only to be recognized in the results it produced. Consequently, 
the results of historiography could not be expressed in a well-defined 
system. 
Furthermore, the evolution of the historical research had to be 
intended as the achievement of a deeper comprehension of particular 
realities and not as the enlargement of a wider and wider system. 
Therefore, if the scientist looks for a complete explanation of phe-
nomena through laws and structures that can include other phenom-
ena, the historian cannot tend to this kind of explanation because he 
is dealing with particular facts that are not included in a general law. 
Finally, Lonergan had to recognize not only that the historians’ 
works could raise many doubts, but also that historiography itself did 
not offer any other verifications except that of doing the work again. 
Thus, these reflections convinced him to moderate the pretensions 
conferred to critical history and to admit that, even if directed by a 
method, history does not realize the method properties in the same 
way as science35. 
 
6. Some critical considerations 
Purposing an essential presentation of Lonergan’s historiographical 
theory, we opted for a reconstruction of the basic theoretical cruxes 
of his thought. Obviously this implied not only a deeper care to his 
main works, but also a lack of space for the comparison he estab-
lished with some of the most representative historians of the last two 
 
35 It should be remembered the definition of “method” proposed by Lonergan: “A 
method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumula-
tive and progressive results” (Lonergan ,2017b: 8). However, in relation to the his-
tory Lonergan wrote: “Finally, while it can be said that history is a science in the 
sense that it is guided by a method, that that method yields univocal answers when 
identical questions are put, and that the results of historical investigations are cu-
mulative, still it has to be acknowledged that these properties of method are not 
realized in the same manner in history and in the natural and the human sciences” 
(Ib.: 207). See “The Philosophy of History” at 56-7 (in Lonergan, 1996a: 54-79). 
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centuries. But, if we do not want to be attracted to lock his theory in 
an abstract cage, we consider worthwhile, at the end of this work, to 
recall some questions Lonergan expressed in Method in Theology, 
from which we may perceive how he felt the limit of his theory. 
His observations about the complexity of a reconstruction of his-
torical events, about the individuality of history that cannot be easily 
turned into what we could see as a new mathesis universalis, mostly 
raised doubts and induced Lonergan to resize his ambitious project of 
a universal mediation of the past. 
This impression strengthens if we also reflect on the architecture 
of Method in Theology. It arouses curiosity the fact that a well-
organized work, which seems not to leave anything hanging (thanks 
to Lonergan’s analytic style), which up to “History” develops coher-
ently by assigning a singular specialty to each chapter, all at once 
breaks its harmonic rhythm to introduce a piece not properly ex-
pected: History and Historians. Lonergan, in fact, had just finished 
the chapter about “History” and it would have been congruent to ex-
pect a chapter about “Dialectic”. Why, then, a further chapter about 
History and Historians? Mere editorial choice, or rather a warning that 
the “assault on the citadel”36 would not be so feasible, because the 
historical knowledge raises more questions than solutions? And, more 
specifically, why did Lonergan insist on distinctions, acknowledge 
some difficulties, declare the inexhaustibility and complexity of the 
problems raised by the historical knowledge? 
This uncertainty became even thicker in the following years. 
Within a series of lessons held in 1976 at the Queen’s University 
(Kingston, Canada) on the topic “Religious Studies and Theology”, 
 
36 In a conference at St. Paul’s Seminary of Pittsburgh (1968), Lonergan enthusias-
tically affirmed: “Transcendental method is the assault on the citadel: it is posses-
sion of the basic method, and all other methods are just so many extensions and 
adaptations of it”. See “The Future of Thomism” at 46 (in Lonergan, 2016: 39–47). 
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Lonergan spoke about an “end of the age of innocence” 37 . The 
acknowledgement by the modern thought of the complex net of 
thoughts, passions, actions, interests, religious options, social pres-
sures and dialectic contrasts, which make up the subject in his histor-
ical condition, was the symptom of the sunset of the concept of man 
as master of himself and author of his destiny. Furthermore, accord-
ing to Lonergan the historical consciousness itself had caused a clear 
awareness of the historicity of the human life, of the plurality and di-
versity of the existing cultures, and of the differences between the 
present cultures and the past ones. Nevertheless, he concluded that, 
even if historicism and hermeneutics had freed the human spirit from 
dogmas and preconceptions of the past, they had not been able to 
orient human judgments and choices, imposing, in this way, the 
ghost of relativism.38 Therefore, it is easy to understand why the Ca-
nadian philosopher insisted on the rational knowledge and on the 
need to formulate judgments able to budge from the spiritual lethar-
gy where scholarship and hermeneutics had closed the human spir-
it39. 
These statements reveal the mood of a no longer young scholar. 
If, on one side, Lonergan still believed in the metaphysical and tran-
scendental foundation of the specialties in which he had included the 
 
37 “The end of the age of innocence means that authenticity is never to be taken for 
granted” (Lonergan, 2017a: 151). 
38 “[...] if individual subjectivity is understood to mean the subject as correlative to 
the world of immediacy, then [...] individual subjectivity, so far from offering a se-
cure foundation, gives rise to serious doubts and well-founded uneasiness [...] 
shortcomings of individuals can become the accepted practice of the group [... 
which] can become the tradition accepted in good faith by succeeding generations 
[...]” (Ib.: 145–146). 
39 Already in the previous decade (1965), on a conference held at the Marquette 
University of Milwaukee, Lonergan declared: “But the vast modern effort to under-
stand meaning in all its manifestations has not been matched by a comparable ef-
fort in judging meaning. The effort to understand is the common task of unnum-
bered scientists and scholars. But judging and deciding are left to the individual, 
and he finds his plight desperate. There is far too much to be learnt before he could 
begin to judge. Yet judge he must and decide he must if he is to exist, if he is to be 
a man.” See “Dimensions of Meaning” at 244 (in Lonergan, 1988: 232–245). 
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positive knowledges, on the other side, this solution does not seem to 
make him free from any doubt. Anyway, it is true that he could not, 
nor had to, travel until the end and analyse the rifts impressed on his 
system by the historical consciousness. He could not, because he was 
already losing his forces; he had not to, because he had reached a 
“cultural synthesis” just in the middle of that general mood of disor-
der and discussion where the Catholic theology had entered in the 
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